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Abstract—Frequent metering of consumption data is crucial
for demand side management in smart grids. However, the
metered data can easily be processed with nonintrusive appliance
load monitoring techniques to infer appliance usage, which
provides insight about the private lives of consumers. Existing
load shaping techniques for privacy focus only on hiding or
altering metered real power, whereas smart meters also collect
reactive power data for various purposes. In this work, we
present optimizing the consumer privacy in a demand response
scheme considering both real and reactive power data. Also, we
consider the user cost and comfort as objectives, and build the
optimization problem in such a way that the effects of optimizing
sub-objectives on the others can be observed. Results show that
hiding only real or only reactive power is not sufficient for
ensuring privacy and they need to be altered simultaneously.
Shaping real and reactive demand at the same time results
in more than twofold increase in privacy in terms of mutual
information.
Index Terms—Demand response, demand shaping, load shap-
ing, multi-objective optimization, privacy, real and reactive
power, smart grids, smart metering.
NOMENCLATURE
Indices and sets
a Index of appliances.
i Index of objectives.
s Index of scenarios.
t, τ Indices of time slots.
Apns Set of power non-shiftable appliances.
Parameters
αa Operation window start of appliance a.
βa Operation window end of appliance a.
γi Weight of objective Oi.
∆t Duration of one time slot.
ηcp Charge efficiency of the battery.
ηdp Discharge efficiency of the battery.
ηcq Charge efficiency of the capacitor.
ηdq Discharge efficiency of the capacitor.
φa,t Penalty cost of appliance a for operating at
time t.
ρs Probability of scenario s.
cpt Cost of real power at time slot t ($/kW).
cq Cost of reactive power ($/kvar).
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Ea Amount of energy that appliance a has to spend
to complete its operation (kWh).
Ebi Initial energy stored in the battery (kWh).
Ebmax Maximum energy that can be stored in the
battery (kWh).
Eci Initial reactive energy stored in the capacitor
(kvarh).
Ecmax Maximum reactive energy that can be stored in
the capacitor (kvarh).
O∗i Optimal value of Oi.
P gs,t Real power generated by the PV generator at
time slot t in scenario s (kW).
Pmax Load capacity of the house (kW).
Pmaxa Maximum real power that appliance a can draw
during operation (kW).
Pmina Minimum real power that appliance a can draw
during operation (kW).
PFa Power factor of appliance a.
Rcbmax Maximum charge rate of the battery (kW).
Rdbmax Maximum discharge rate of the battery (kW).
Rccmax Maximum charge rate of the capacitor (kvar).
Rdcmax Maximum discharge rate of the capacitor
(kvar).
Variables
Oi Value of the objective i.
pcs,t Metered real power at time t in scenario s
(kW).
qcs,t Metered reactive power at time t in scenario s
(kW).
pcaa,s,t Real power consumed by appliance a at time
t in scenario s (kW).
qcaa,s,t Reactive power consumed by appliance a at
time t in scenario s (kvar).
pcbs,t Real power charged into the battery at time t
in scenario s (kW).
pdbs,t Real power discharged from the battery at time
t in scenario s (kW).
qccs,t Reactive power charged into the capacitor at
time t in scenario s (kvar).
qdcs,t Reactive power discharged from the capacitor
at time t in scenario s (kvar).
vs,t Real power drawn from the PV generator at
time t in scenario s (kW).
ya,s,t A binary variable that takes the value 1 if
power non-shiftable appliance a operates at
time t in scenario s.
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2I. INTRODUCTION
SMART metering is a crucial part of the smart grid (SG)structure. Frequent measurements collected from smart
meters are used in accurate and personalized billing services,
detecting outages and electricity theft, load forecasting, de-
mand side management and much more [1]. However, smart
meter data can also be used by adversaries to violate the
privacy of the consumers [2]–[4].
The group of methods used for extracting appliance or
end-use data from aggregated household meter data is called
Nonintrusive Appliance Load Monitoring (NIALM) [5]. Most
of these NIALM methods detect edges on the time-series meter
data, and use methods such as cluster analysis to map the
change in the metered data to an appliance or end-use [6]. The
change in the power as well as other transient and steady-state
properties such as duration and periodicity are used as features
in the analysis.
There are numerous methods that aim to mitigate the privacy
problem induced by smart metering and NIALM. The methods
can be categorized into five: Adding noise to the metered data
to achieve differential privacy, using homomorphic encryption
techniques to hide sensitive data, using pseudonyms instead of
consumer identification, reducing the metering frequency and
shaping the consumer demand. Among these methods, load
shaping (LS) (or demand shaping - DS) is one of the most
promising in terms of simplicity, efficiency and applicability
[7].
Numerous LS methods have been proposed in the literature
[8], most of which are based on algorithms, heuristics and
game theory. These methods focus on shaping the metered
real power (P ) consumed by the customer in such a way
that it does not give away appliance-specific signatures. For
shaping the real power, they use household amenities such as
rechargeable batteries (RB), renewable energy sources (RES)
as well as some appliances runtime and/or power consumption
of which can be shifted (e.g. plug-in electric vehicles).
Although the number of these LS methods are extensive,
they miss a key point: smart meters do not measure only the
real power. They measure instantaneous voltage and current,
and hence the apparent power (S), which has both real (P ) and
reactive (Q) power components. Since consumers are usually
billed based on the real power consumption, the reactive power
is often overlooked by the smart grid privacy research commu-
nity. However, reactive power is also a matter of importance
for the supply side, since having a high reactive load decreases
the power factor (P/ |S|) and hence the efficiency of the
system. Therefore, utility companies (UC) also keep track of
the reactive power demand as depicted in Fig. 1.
Just like the real power, the reactive power also carries
signatures of individual appliances. In fact, the change in the
reactive power is one of the key features looked into by the
NIALM methods [9]. Therefore, in order to ensure privacy, P
and Q must be shaped simultaneously. In this study, we used
the real and reactive power measurements from the Ampds2
dataset [10] to show that hiding only P or only Q is not
enough to ensure privacy. In order to do that, we constructed
a multi-objective optimization problem which maximizes the
Fig. 1: Proposed smart home structure.
privacy of the consumer (by shaping P , Q or both) while also
considering the cost and the comfort of the consumer. Our
contributions to the literature are as follows:
1) To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study
that considers real and reactive power simultaneously in
preserving consumer privacy in smart grids.
2) We formulated the problem of maximizing privacy by
using real and reactive power as a multi-objective mixed-
integer-linear program and found optimal limits for pri-
vacy performance as well as its effect on cost and
comfort.
3) Comparing the solutions which consider only P , only Q
and both P and Q; we showed that shaping only the real
load or only the reactive load is not sufficient to ensure
privacy.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section II
presents a review of the literature on load shaping based
privacy protection in SGs. Our multi-objective optimization
formulation is described in Section III. Results of our analysis
are presented in Section IV. Concluding remarks are made in
Section V.
II. RELATED WORK
In this section, we provide a short summary of previous
works on privacy protection via LS. Note that all of the studies
below considered only metered real power as the data that
needs to be shaped. [11] by Fan et al. is the only study that
considered the reactive power and proposed using household
capacitors to shape the reactive load. None of the existing
studies, however, had considered hiding both real and reactive
power for privacy.
Kalogridis et al. [12] (best effort algorithm), McLaughlin et
al. [13] (nonintrusive load leveling algorithm), Ge et al. [14]
(tolerable deviation algorithm), and Yang et al. [15] (stepping
algorithm) proposed heuristic methods that laid the foundation
for the LS methods. These algorithms change the load with
the help of RBs, RESs and shiftable appliances.
Other studies that used various amenities to shape the load
for privacy followed the aforementioned methods. Zhao et
al. [16] used RBs to randomly change the metered load to
ensure differential privacy. Egarter et al. [17] used shiftable
appliances instead of RBs to shape the load. Giaconi et
3al. [7] exploited RBs and RESs to find an optimal energy
management policy. Chen et al. [18], [19] proposed using
thermal storage such as water heaters instead of RBs to
increase privacy. Reinhardt et al. [20] proposed a method for
privacy by utilizing photovoltaic (PV) generators. Liu et al.
[21] studied privacy in case of multiple RBs in a cascaded
fashion. Sun et al. [22], [23] proposed utilizing plug-in electric
vehicles (PEV) and household devices such as HVACs as
energy storage in shaping the load for privacy. Moon et al.
[24] optimized privacy and cost together in an optimization
framework by using a RB. Liu et al. [25] optimized user cost,
privacy and comfort with the help of shiftable appliances and
RBs. Tan et al. [26] studied optimal privacy-cost trade-off with
the help of household RBs. Isikman et al. [27] optimized the
privacy and power usage (utility) of consumer with the help
of RBs and RESs.
Further studies regarding load shaping and privacy included
Li et al. [28], [29] and Erdemir et al. [30] who studied
optimal RB policies by reformulating the privacy optimization
as a Markov decision proces (MDP). Yang et al. [31] and
Chen et al. [32] proposed online algorithms for preserving
privacy via using a RB and shiftable appliances. Koo et al.
[33] proposed a learning based LS scheme to hide both high
and low frequency load signatures for privacy. Hossain et
al. [34] and Natgunanathan et al. [35] proposed online and
offline heuristic methods to mitigate the problem of preserving
privacy in case of prolonged high or low loads and finite
capacity RBs.
All these studies and methods except [11] considered only
shaping the real load, and their privacy assessments did not
include the mutual information between the reactive load of
appliances and the aggregated reactive load. On the other hand,
[11] only considered shaping the reactive load and did not
consider the effects of shaping the reactive load on the real
load. We model the optimization problem that shapes both P
and Q in the following section.
III. PROBLEM FORMULATION
We consider a smart-metered house with shiftable and
non-shiftable appliances, a household battery for real power
compensation, a household capacitor for reactive power com-
pensation, a PV generator, and a PEV as in Fig. 1. We
assume a demand response (DR) scheme where the utility
company (UC) provides day-ahead real-time pricing (RTP)
to the consumer, and consumers try to find an optimal
schedule for their appliances according to their cost, comfort
and privacy priorities. Time-shiftable appliances have certain
operation windows within which they must complete their op-
eration. Similarly, power-shiftable appliances have maximum
and minimum power levels within which they can operate.
We assume that the power generated by the PV can be
estimated with stochastic approximation. Therefore, we use
stochastic optimization to optimize the expected values of
the objectives given different scenarios (s) in which the PV
generator generates different outputs.
A. Stochastic Approximation of Solar Power
We used Monte Carlo sampling to generate 10000 sample
vectors of PV outputs (each of size T ) with the distribution in
(1), (2) and then by using K-means clustering [32], reduced
the number of vectors to 10. These 10 PV power output
scenarios and their occurrence probabilities are then used in
the stochastic optimization formulation.
The distribution of the solar irradiance was modeled as a
bimodal distribution [36]. Beta distribution (1) was used for
each mode.
fb(x) =
{
Γ(α+β)
Γ(α)Γ(β)x
α−1(1− x)β−1, 0 ≤ x ≤ 1;α, β ≥ 0
0, otherwise.
(1)
Parameters α and β were calculated from the mean and
variance of the solar radiation data which has been provided
in [36]. Γ represents the Gamma function and fb(x) is the pdf
of the solar irradiance (kW/m2). The power generated by the
PV was obtained by using the irradiance-to-power conversion
function [36] as
fpv(x) = ηpv · §pv · x, (2)
where §pv and ηpv represent the solar panel area (m2) and the
efficiency of solar panels (%), respectively.
B. Objectives
Our objectives include maximizing privacy by minimizing
the information leakage out of both the real and the reactive
aggregated loads, as well as minimizing the user cost and dis-
comfort. Since shaping the loads for increasing privacy would
incur some monetary cost and discomfort to the consumer,
these should also be considered while optimizing user privacy.
1) Maximizing the Privacy by Shaping P and Q: We define
the privacy objective as a generic function F which depends
on the metered real and reactive powers pcs,t and q
c
s,t of the
house. F can be formulated depending on the method that will
be used for preserving privacy. For the sake of demonstration,
we adopt the best effort method [12] and extend it to consider
both P and Q in (3). Note that other methods in the literature
could also be formulated as in [8] and extended to include
shaping the reactive load.
F ,
S∑
s=1
T∑
t=2
ρs ·
( ∣∣∣pcs,t − pcs,(t−1)∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣qcs,t − qcs,(t−1)∣∣∣ ) (3)
By defining F this way, we assume that the temporal differ-
ences of metered real and reactive loads have the same impact
on privacy. In this study, we would like to show the difference
between shaping both P and Q vs. shaping them separately.
Therefore we divide (3) into two separate privacy objectives
so that we can weight them accordingly to simulate different
cases.
O1 =
S∑
s=1
T∑
t=2
ρs ·
∣∣∣pcs,t − pcs,(t−1)∣∣∣ (4)
O2 =
S∑
s=1
T∑
t=2
ρs ·
∣∣∣qcs,t − qcs,(t−1)∣∣∣ (5)
42) Minimizing the Monetary Cost: The monetary cost could
be defined as the product of metered real power (pcs,t) and its
price (cpt ). However, since we are also considering the reactive
power, its cost can also be added to the formulation.
O3 =
S∑
s=1
ρs ·
T∑
t=1
(
cpt · pcs,t + cq · qcs,t
)
. (6)
Although currently consumers are not charged for their re-
active power consumption, high reactive loads induce in-
efficiency to the grid, which is indirectly reflected on the
pricing. In addition, incurring a cost on reactive power would
also eliminate the possibility of unnecessary reactive power
consumption in the optimal solution. We assume a constant
and relatively small cost cq for the reactive power usage.
3) Minimizing the Discomfort: Shaping the load demand
causes a certain discomfort to the user if appliance usages are
shifted. We model this discomfort by defining an exponentially
increasing penalty coefficient φa,t for each appliance usage at
each time slot.
O4 =
A∑
a=1
S∑
s=1
T∑
t=1
ρs · φa,t · pcaa,s,t (7)
Note that, unlike the other objectives, here we did not use a
reactive power term. The reason is that consumer comfort can
be solely measured in terms of the real power usage. If there
were purely reactive loads in a household environment, then
it would be necessary to include qcaa,s,t into this objective.
C. Constraints
We can divide the constraints into three categories: Appli-
ance power constraints, power balance constraints and bat-
tery/capacitor constraints. All three categories have additional
constraints compared with legacy optimization formulations
due to the inclusion of reactive power.
1) Appliance Power Constraints: Constraint (8) makes sure
that the real power used by appliance a is 0 outside its
operation window. Constraint (9) makes sure that power-
shiftable appliances run within their power limits. Constraint
(10) limits the power usage of power-non-shiftable appliances
to either 0 or Pmaxa . Constraint (11) makes sure that all
appliances use the exact amount of energy for completing their
operation. Constraint (12) makes sure that the real and reactive
power usage of appliance a are proportional to its power factor.
pcaa,s,t = 0, ∀a, s,∀t /∈ [αa, βa] (8)
Pmina ≤ pcaa,s,t ≤ Pmaxa , ∀a, s, t (9)
pcaa,s,t = ya,s,t · Pmaxa , ∀s, t,∀a ∈ Apns (10)
∆T ·
T∑
t=1
pcaa,s,t = Ea, ∀a, s (11)
qcaa,s,t = tan(arccos(PFa)) · pcaa,s,t, ∀a, s, t (12)
In (12), we assumed that all the appliances have a con-
stant power factor. Indeed, this may not be the case for
some appliances with multiple components. However, these
components could still be modeled as individual appliances
whose operations are dependent on each other. Thus, their P -
Q relations could still be modeled in a linear way as in (12).
2) Power Balance Constraints: Constraint (13) along with
(14) is the real power balance constraint. Constraint (15) is
the reactive power balance constraint. The upper bound of
household demand is enforced in (16).
pcs,t =
A∑
a=1
pcaa,s,t + p
cb
s,t
/
ηcp − pdbs,t · ηdp − vs,t, ∀s, t (13)
vs,t ≤ P gs,t, ∀s, t (14)
qcs,t =
A∑
a=1
qcaa,s,t + q
cb
s,t
/
ηcq − qdbs,t · ηdq, ∀s, t (15)
pcs,t ≤ Pmax, ∀s, t (16)
3) Battery and Capacitor Constraints: Constraints (17),
(18) make sure that at any time slot τ , the capacities of the
battery and the capacitor are not exceeded. Constraints (19)
and (20) limit the amount of real power charged into or dis-
charged from the battery. Similarly, Constraints (22) and (23)
limit the rate at which reactive power can be stored/provided
by the capacitor. Constraints (21) and (24) make sure that the
amount of real and reactive power stored at the end of the day
are the same with those at the beginning of the day.
0 ≤ Ebi +
τ∑
t=1
∆t · pcbs,t −
τ∑
t=1
∆t · pdbs,t ≤ Ebmax,∀s, τ (17)
0 ≤ Eci +
τ∑
t=1
∆t · qcbs,t −
τ∑
t=1
∆t · qdbs,t ≤ Ecmax,∀s, τ (18)
pcbs,t ≤ Rcbmax, ∀s, t (19)
pdbs,t ≤ Rdbmax, ∀s, t (20)
T∑
t=1
pcbs,t =
T∑
t=1
pdbs,t, ∀s (21)
qccs,t ≤ Rccmax, ∀s, t (22)
qdcs,t ≤ Rdcmax, ∀s, t (23)
T∑
t=1
qcbs,t =
T∑
t=1
qdbs,t, ∀s (24)
D. Multi-objective Optimization Model
We used goal programming method for modeling our multi-
objective optimization problem. One reason for using goal
programming is that we can find Pareto efficient solutions for
any set of weights (γi). Secondly, we can show the optimal
results of real-power-only privacy, reactive-power-only privacy
and both real and reactive power based privacy simply by
arranging the weights (γi) accordingly.
minimize Z (25)
subject to Z ≥ γi · Oi −O
∗
i
O∗i
, ∀i (26)
subject to constraints (4)− (24) (27)
In the next section we show the results for both formulations
which expose the privacy leakage when shaping only the real
and reactive power and show the improvement in privacy when
both are simultaneously shaped.
5IV. RESULTS
We used GAMS IDE to implement our mixed-integer linear
program and solved it with CPLEX on a system with 4-core
8-thread core-i7 processor and 32GB of RAM.
We used the minutely real and reactive power measure-
ment data from Ampds2 dataset [10]. We chose the data of
12/19/2012, on which day all the appliances were used in the
household.
Mutual information (MI) has been used predominantly as
a privacy metric in the previous studies [21]–[24], [28], [30],
[33], [35], [37], [38]. Therefore, we adopted empirical MI as
the privacy measure. We calculated the MI between the actual
(real and reactive) power usage and metered (real and reactive)
power usage. We also calculated the MI between (real and
reactive) power usage of individual appliances and the metered
(real and reactive) power.
A. Effects of shaping real and reactive power on privacy
We specified 6 cases along with the original appliance usage
(case 0) for comparison in order to show the effectiveness of
hiding both real and reactive power. Case 0 refers to the orig-
inal metered data without any LS. Case 1 corresponds to the
case with real-power-based-only optimal privacy preservation.
In case 2, privacy is preserved optimally by only shaping the
reactive power. Real and reactive power based load shaping
is optimized in case 3. Case 4 represents the case where real
and reactive power based privacy is optimized along with user
cost and comfort. Cases 5 and 6 represents when user cost
and comfort are jointly optimized with real-power-based and
reactive-power-based privacy, respectively (see Table I).
TABLE I: Cases and their corresponding weights.
Case Weights
# γ1 γ2 γ3 γ4
0 0 0 0 0
1 1 0 0 0
2 0 1 0 0
3 1 1 0 0
4 1 1 1 1
5 1 0 1 1
6 0 1 1 1
The MI between the actual (real and reactive) loads and
metered (real and reactive) loads are provided in Table II and
Fig. 2. It can be seen that the amount of information in the
metered load of case 3 is 79% less than case 1, where only
the real power is shaped. Even in case 4, where user cost and
comfort are also optimized along with privacy, there is more
than twofold increase in the privacy compared to cases 2 and
3.
In Fig. 3, metered real and reactive loads of the house is
plotted for different cases. Fig. 3-b and Fig. 3-c show that
when only the real or only the reactive load is shaped, the
other load that has not been shaped still contains information
regarding the appliance usage. Fig. 3-d shows that we can
successfully hide most of the information on real and reactive
metered loads with small compromises from their singular
optimal shapes.
TABLE II: Mutual Information between metered real & reac-
tive power and the actual real & reactive power.
Case MI (bits)
# real reactive total
0 6.88 4.86 11.74
1 0.40 3.07 3.47
2 4.90 0.33 5.23
3 0.40 0.33 0.73
4 1.19 0.24 1.43
Fig. 2: The mutual information between metered and actual
real (P) and reactive (Q) loads in different cases
Table III shows the average MI between appliance loads
and metered (real and reactive) loads. It can be seen that,
shaping real and reactive load at the same time (case 3) results
in more than 60% decrease in average MI compared to real
power shaping only (case 1) and reactive power shaping only
(case 2). When all the objectives are optimized together (case
4), the average MI is still less than 50% of the average MI in
cases 1 and 2.
Fig. 3: Metered real and reactive loads of the house. a: original
data (case 0). b: real-power-based LS (case 1), c: reactive-
power-based LS (case 2), d: real & reactive power based LS
with min. cost and max. comfort (case 4)
6TABLE III: Average MI between metered real & reactive
power and appliances’ real & reactive power.
Case Average MI (bits/appliance)
# real reactive total
0 1.24 0.60 1.84
1 0.19 1.38 1.57
2 1.52 0.22 1.74
3 0.25 0.24 0.49
4 0.45 0.18 0.63
Fig. 4: Changes in the metered real and reactive loads in
different cases
Fig. 4 shows the ∆P −∆Q plane for cases 1, 2 and 3. In
case 1, ∆P is almost always 0 which means that there is no
information about the appliances’ real power usage. However,
there is still some information on the ∆Q axis. Similarly, in
case 2 ∆Q is almost always 0, while ∆P ranges between
±400W . In case 3, however, (∆P,∆Q) is (0, 0) for the
majority of the time, which reveals no information about the
appliances. This is another way of visualising the importance
of shaping the real power and the reactive power together.
B. Effects of shaping real and reactive power on other objec-
tives
In this section, we compared three multi-objective cases
(case 4, case 5 and case 6) to observe the effects of shaping
both real and reactive power on the other objectives. It can
be seen from Table IV that, shaping both the real and the
reactive power (case 4) increases the cost and discomfort of
the consumer more than shaping only the real power (case
5) or shaping only the reactive power (case 6) does. This is
an expected result, as the privacy objectives are inherently
conflicting with the cost and comfort objectives. However,
the increase of the cost and discomfort in case 4 is less than
8% compared to cases 5 and 6, which is a small compromise
compared with the more than twofold increase in privacy.
V. CONCLUSION
We presented the optimal privacy results in a demand
response scheme by shaping both the real and the reactive
metered power. Our results revealed that shaping only the
TABLE IV: Effects of optimizing real and reactive power on
the other consumer objectives.
Case Objective value (% increase from the optimal)
# cost discomfort
4 1623 (30.7%) 3296 (30.5%)
5 1590 (28.1%) 3091 (22.5%)
6 1568 (26.4%) 3160 (25.2%)
real or the reactive load can result in serious data leakage for
consumers. Major takeaways from this study are as follows:
1) When the real power (P ) and the reactive power (Q) are
shaped together, the optimal privacy is enhanced more
than 50% in terms of mutual information. In other words,
when P or Q is shaped alone, the total mutual informa-
tion between the actual and metered loads increase at least
twofold compared to shaping both P and Q together.
2) Optimizing privacy by shaping both the real and reactive
power results in 30.7% and 30.5% increase in consumer
cost and discomfort, respectively, from their singular
optimal values. However, the additional burden of shaping
both P and Q is less than 8% when compared to real-
power-only or reactive-power-only privacy optimization.
Future research directions include using additional amenities
such as PV generators for shaping the reactive load. Although
currently PV generators are restricted to have unity power
factors, they can be used for reactive power compensation [39]
which can also help shaping the reactive load for privacy.
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